Interview with Michael Frendo: Commonwealth Oral History Project by Onslow, Sue et al.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOICE FILE NAME: COHP Michael Frendo 
 
 
Key: 
SO: Dr Sue Onslow (Interviewer) 
MF: Mr Michael Frendo (Respondent) 
 
 
Please Note: The respondent stipulates that researchers should seek his 
permission before publishing or disseminating work drawing on this interview. 
 
SO:  This is Dr Sue Onslow talking to Mr Michael Frendo on Friday, 31st 
January 2014. Mr Frendo, thank you very much indeed for coming to 
Senate House to talk to us for the Commonwealth Oral History Project. I 
wonder if you could begin, please, by setting out your view of the 
awareness and value of the Commonwealth for you, as a Maltese 
politician, but also for your country. 
 
MF:  Well, I would say that the Commonwealth is a reality which is quite well 
known in Malta. People know that Malta belongs to the Commonwealth, 
obviously, and because it’s also part of our history. Since we only became 
independent in 1964, I think there’s a general consciousness that after 
independence we became members of the Council of Europe, members of 
the United Nations and members of the Commonwealth. Clearly, now that we 
are members of the European Union, that takes centre stage. But still, there is 
a consciousness of the Commonwealth, and the 2005 CHOGM organised in 
Malta helped very much to highlight the Commonwealth as a reality. 
 
  Before I was elected as an MP, I was very conscious of the Commonwealth 
and of the concept of the Commonwealth family. I can’t say it was very clear 
what the ‘value added’ of being a member of the Commonwealth was. It’s 
something that’s still being discussed now, but certainly there was nobody 
who ever suggested we should leave the Commonwealth. It was very 
interesting that all our political leaders since independence up to today have 
at no point ever discussed the issue of whether or not we should be members 
of the Commonwealth. That included Mr Dom Mintoff, who had lots of issues 
with the British government. 
 
SO:  Indeed. 
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MF:  But not with Britain as such, I don’t think. That included also the Nationalist 
Party, I have to say. The Nationalist Party was actually set up in 1800 to 
obtain independence from the British. So, the Nationalist Party was the party 
in government when we became independent in 1964, and it was the party 
that emphasised our membership of the Commonwealth. So, there is a 
general consensus about membership of the Commonwealth in the country. 
 
  As an MP, I came across some very interesting experiences in terms of the 
Commonwealth. I think the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association does 
great work, and when you’re a Member of Parliament, it gives you an 
international dimension which is very useful – particularly if you come from a 
small island state; you can exchange experiences and views. As a minister – I 
was Minister for Youth – I remember attending a Commonwealth Youth 
Ministers meeting in the Maldives which, again, was very interesting because 
you were exchanging experiences. I think the first-hand exchange of 
experiences between people who have responsibilities for certain sectors in a 
country is invaluable, and you can learn much more than if you read about it. 
Obviously, also, [there are] the contacts and the networks which developed 
from that. So, I’m not sure whether I agree with this Maltese journalist who 
described the Commonwealth in 2005 as a “bag of contradictions and 
massive misfits.”   
 
SO:  That was a direct quote from an article by Derek Ingram, who is, of 
course, a leading Commonwealth journalist… 
 
MF:  Yes. 
 
SO:  He was reporting on the Valletta CHOGM in 2005. He didn’t say which 
Maltese journalist it was who described the Commonwealth in such 
terms!  
 
MF:  [Laughter] 
 
SO:  I think the Commonwealth is an extraordinary association because it 
has the showcase of the heads of government meeting, but then, as 
you’ve said, it’s the wider family which is of critical importance in 
providing those knowledge and personal networks. 
 
MF:  Yes. I have to say that when I was Minister of Foreign Affairs, I utilised this to 
the full. For a small country, it is important for you to find affinity with other 
states, and in fact whenever I was speaking to a Commonwealth country – 
even on bilateral issues or even on EU issues – I would bring up the 
connection. It would almost come up in a natural way, that we were both 
members of the Commonwealth. I think it creates a certain sense of affinity, 
which is very difficult to pin down, but it’s a sense of belonging to the same 
club. Perhaps having undergone the same colonial experiences, having 
similar structures in Parliament, particularly, or in the Civil Service, where very 
often the structures are similar, and sometimes even the terminologies are 
the same… Malta doesn’t have the affinity of common law, because we are a 
civil law country, but that affinity, I think, helps, and it creates a sense of 
greater trust somehow. When you are talking to the Foreign Minister of 
another Commonwealth country, you identify yourselves as Foreign Ministers 
of two Commonwealth states. When I was Minister of Foreign Affairs, we also 
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utilised this – the Commonwealth connection – to the full whenever we had a 
candidate for a post at the UN. 
 
SO:  The use of the Commonwealth as ‘smart power’? 
 
MF:  That was really useful, because you could have a sort of introductory card to 
our ambassadors who would meet, and again, that was another dimension. 
As a small state, there is no dimension which is yours which you should ever 
give up, and that, to us, is what the Commonwealth dimension means. It’s the 
dimension to our reach as a small state – which, therefore, increases our 
relevance. And that’s why I think nobody has ever thought of giving this up. 
 
  On the other hand, Malta would like to take a lead in certain areas in the 
Commonwealth. We took a certain lead in ICT – Information and 
Communication Technologies – with the ‘Commonwealth Network of 
Information Technology for Development’, COMNET-IT, which is a foundation 
set up for the dissemination of ICT in the Commonwealth. I hope we made 
some contribution when I was Chair of Commonwealth Connects, which had 
started under Don McKinnon, and hopefully we made a contribution when we 
were members and later Chair of CMAG. But perhaps the one thing which 
made a difference – at least in these last years – was holding CHOGM in 
Malta. That increased the relevance bilaterally beyond the importance of the 
Commonwealth itself. 
 
SO:  If I could take you to this, because the decision to hold the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Malta in 2005 would 
have been taken at the Abuja meeting in 2003, or in the interim between 
the Abuja CHOGM and the following year. When was the decision made 
for Malta’s offer to hold the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting in Valletta? 
 
MF:  I think the decision was made in the preceding CHOGM at Abuja. As far as I 
recollect, it was Abuja. It was Prime Minister Fenech Adami who was still 
there as Prime Minister. It was his last CHOGM, and he decided to take this 
on. There was a change of Prime Ministers from the same party in between, 
and I happened to be Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time. I was appointed 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2004, so I was, to a large extent, involved in the 
organisation of the Malta CHOGM. What was interesting was that the Malta 
CHOGM was the first time we gave a specific role to the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs. I can remember from when I became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
2004, that in discussions with Don McKinnon it was clear that there was a 
willingness to give a role to the foreign ministers rather than having them as 
part of the delegation with the heads of governments with no particular 
function. I was entrusted with the idea: to try and give that a life of its own. 
  
  I have to say that we discussed the various items which we were going to put 
on the agenda, which included migration [and] it included climate change – 
those are the two that I remember very clearly in my mind. And what I did was 
set a rule that there should be no written speeches, that there should be open 
discussion, [and] that one should speak between three and five minutes. We 
also [did] a lot of preparatory work for each foreign minister to receive a 
background note on each subject, and at the end of that background note we 
also asked three questions that the ministers might wish to address. 
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  So, we tried to channel the discussion around the number of topics. To a 
large extent, I was using a model that I had been familiar with in the European 
Convention on the Future of Europe, chaired by Giscard d’Estaing, when we 
drafted the Constitution for Europe, and that was using a two/three page 
paper as a background for its subject, and one of those pages would be three 
questions that the ministers might wish to address. It worked brilliantly. We 
had a very lively discussion; we had a discussion that went around the room. 
The ministers were feeling that they were debating [and] not reading texts to 
each other – there was interaction – and I have to say that it worked 
extremely well. 
 
  The thing which we introduced at the Malta CHOGM was the meeting with 
civil society. This was greatly wished for by civil society – it had been 
discussed at length with the Secretariat. There were fears that we would have 
a sort of G8-style of demonstrations and protests if we did this, but of course, 
this did not take place. We structured it in [such] a way that we had civil 
society engage with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, so it gave another role to 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs – to engage with civil society on 
Commonwealth issues. And that was a free session where representatives of 
civil society came round the table with all the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. I 
have to say, there was huge participation by the ministers. I think they were 
all there, and we had an exchange of views which went extremely well. I think 
it opened, also, the way for this sort of direct linkage between civil society [as] 
normally represented by the Commonwealth Foundation and civil society 
groupings directly with the member states, as represented by the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs.   
 
  I think those were the two innovations which we had. We introduced another 
innovation when we were Chair-in-Office. We introduced an informal session 
complementary to the session which foreign ministers have on the side of the 
United Nations General Assembly. That session of foreign ministers is 
normally quite formal, with a very formal agenda. We introduced a lunchtime 
open discussion for foreign ministers at the UN, so that we could discuss 
other issues which were of interest to us, even in the inner context of the UN. 
This was an informal working lunch. Although it was not modelled on it, I 
would say it was similar to the informal lunches of the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of the EU, where you have ministers only, and that was a ‘ministers 
only’ lunch. 
 
SO:  So, no officials? 
 
MF:  No officials, no record, no notes and no statements: simply an exchange of 
views, open, on a number of issues, just to get the feeling of where we stand 
on certain issues. And I’m afraid I can’t remember what the agenda was, but it 
is easily obtainable from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
SO:  So, you initiated this in 2006? 
 
MF:  2006. We did it…I don’t know whether we did it once or did it twice. I don’t 
think it was taken up by the following Chair-in-Office, which is a pity, because 
it created a sense of camaraderie within the UN, which is what we were trying 
to achieve, which went beyond just having a formal meeting. And it was very 
well attended, by the way; surprisingly so. 
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SO:  Michael, please, could I ask you about this growing role for foreign 
ministers? You appear to be emphasizing the re-injection of a degree of 
spontaneity, trust and sharing, and a focus on key questions – rather 
than taking particular platforms or standpoints and reading out great 
speeches – with the innovation of the foreign ministers meeting with 
civil society groupings in Valletta. In what way did this inadvertently 
eclipse the heads aspect [of the CHOGM]? Do busy heads – if they feel 
that their foreign ministers are taking a growing role or a particular 
activity on a brief – in your experience, do they devolve to them that 
responsibility, and step back and concentrate their own energy 
somewhere else? 
 
MF:  Well, it was actually intended for the heads to have even more leeway as to 
what they want to do with their time. I remember discussing this with Don 
McKinnon, and the idea was that we’d refrain from formalising the Retreat 
and the meetings of the heads. I think we managed to do that without, in any 
way, usurping the territory of the heads. On the other hand, the heads could 
discuss any other issues which were of interest to them. What was important 
in all of this? And why am I emphasising the spontaneity, etc. etc,? I think it is 
the spirit of the Commonwealth. If the Commonwealth does not have the spirit 
of informality, and it does not the spirit of friendship, I think it loses a major 
asset. And that’s how we tried to carry out even the discussions between the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. We did not necessarily have, let’s say, 
consensual, quiet discussions. For example, on the issue of migration, we 
had a very heated discussion. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  I can well imagine how robust that was! 
 
MF:  You can imagine that Malta would have looked at that as a country of 
destination, or a country of transit. And there were a number of countries of 
origin of migration which were also around the table. On the issue of climate 
change, we had big issues, because we had major polluters around the table, 
too – notably, India – and therefore they were very sensitive to certain 
statements. But it was an open discussion: people could say exactly how they 
felt. There had already been an agreement on the final declaration at the 
‘committee of the whole’, so we didn’t really go into too much nitty-gritty. I 
don’t recall us going into much nitty-gritty on the declaration from the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Actually, the Declaration of CHOGM was not from 
the ministers, but it was the ministers who negotiated that. I think the heads 
came out with a communiqué, is that right? 
 
SO:  Yes, the delegates issued the Valletta Declaration of Multilateral Trade. 
 
MF:  Which is a two-page statement. 
 
SO:  It refers to three various subsidies, particularly agricultural subsidies. 
They also called for a renewal of democracy. 
 
MF:  And what was interesting at that time was that it was preceding the new round 
of Doha. And, actually, that issue came out very clearly, and Malta and the 
UK took a very active role in agreeing the Declaration. If you read the 
Declaration, it’s a Declaration which supports very much small states and 
developing countries, and a number of countries within the EU later took 
umbrage to the fact that two EU member states had with them the contacts of 
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the Commonwealth. You won’t find this written anywhere, but I know that 
there were rumblings, that people were not happy with [the fact] that both the 
UK and Malta – and Cyprus – had participated and given their assent to that 
sort of Declaration which, to some extent, put the EU on the spot. 
 
SO:  Oh, they’d stepped outside the EU tent? 
 
MF:  Exactly. So, we’d stepped outside the EU tent, and that was a little bit… 
People got edgy about that. 
 
SO:  But there were no formal representations? 
 
MF:  No, But I remember officials from my ministry relating to me that in meetings 
this had been mentioned, and formally that other countries didn’t like it at all. I 
don’t know which countries of the EU, but other countries in the EU. 
 
SO:  I’ve been told that Don McKinnon was quite explicit in trying to use the 
Commonwealth to leverage more states on the issue of finance, and 
also particularly on the issue of trade. How does this accord with your 
own experience of his strategy as Secretary General? 
 
MF:  Yes, but we were in agreement with that. We felt that we should give as much 
support as we can to those states. I think [that], in the declaration, we made 
some references to the EU relationship with small states. This is what got a 
little bit tricky, because we made direct reference. If you read through that, 
you will find a direct reference to the fact that, at that time, I think, economic 
partnership agreements were being discussed and negotiated between the 
European Union and some Commonwealth member states: the Caribbean 
comes to mind. By showing support for them, it was seen a little bit that we 
went beyond our EU brief. But that’s what the Commonwealth does. You can 
push the frontiers a little bit – maybe not too much, but you can push the 
frontiers a little bit. There are three countries in the EU that are members of 
the Commonwealth, and I have to say, when we were Chair-in-Office – just 
on another point – we did intervene on Commonwealth or Commonwealth-
related issues in the EU. Now, I did that as Minister of Foreign Affairs within 
the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU, because I wanted to keep increasing 
the relevance of my country in the EU. So, in a way, we utilised the fact that 
we were Chair-in-Office of the Commonwealth to show that Malta had other 
dimensions and that within the EU family, now we could also speak about 
issues relating to Commonwealth member states, which is something I would 
not do otherwise. So, for example, even though it’s no longer a 
Commonwealth member state, Malta took a very active part in discussions 
within the EU foreign ministers meeting on how to deal with Zimbabwe. We 
took part in discussions relating to Fiji and to other Commonwealth countries. 
At the time, we also had just finished our term of office as Chair of CMAG, so, 
we could speak about certain situations with certain direct knowledge. That 
increased our relevance as a small state within the EU.   
 
  So, the Commonwealth, in my opinion, can help small states to be relevant – 
not only within the Commonwealth, but to be relevant also in other 
organisations like the UN and other regional organisations, or sub-regional 
organisations. In our case [and] in the case of Cyprus – and the UK, to some 
extent – this was an issue of relevance when we were settling issues on 
countries in the EU that were also member states of the Commonwealth. 
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SO:  Yes. 
 
MF:  You asked me about the Cyprus issue. That’s an important issue for us. 
We’ve always shown a lot of support for Cyprus. Cyprus is very often an ally 
of ours within the context of the EU. The Cypriots, I have to say, lobbied us – 
me, in particular – quite strongly about a good paragraph about their situation 
in the final declaration for the Malta CHOGM. And, in fact, they got a very 
good paragraph supporting them in the declaration, which was prepared by 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 
 
SO:  Was this prepared by you and your officials? 
 
MF:  [It was] suggested by them and brought to the discussion of everyone. But, of 
course, there were discussions on that, because although Turkey is not a 
member of the Commonwealth, of course, Turkey is a member of the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and it does raise issues; there are 
countries who would speak for Turkey on that issue. So, Cyprus was very 
pleased with that paragraph in the declaration – I’m speaking about CHOGM 
2005 – and I know that when the President of Cyprus went back to Cyprus, 
this was an issue with the press: that the Commonwealth had given strong 
support for Cyprus on the issue of the division of the island. 
 
  So, that was an important issue. I don’t think that the Commonwealth affected 
my work very much as Minister of Transport and Communications, other than 
keeping in touch with other Commonwealth Ministers. I don’t recall that we 
had a meeting of Ministers. 
 
SO:  You had mentioned particularly Malta supporting the work on ICT. 
Obviously, this concerned particularly telecommunications? 
 
MF:  Yes, but that came later, because I was Minister of Foreign Affairs then. 
Indirectly, I suppose, when I was Minister of Transport and Communications, 
there was already COMNET-IT set up. And I think that was what our 
contribution to the Commonwealth was at the time. I was Parliamentary 
Secretary – Junior Minister – of Foreign Affairs for two months. I became a 
full rank Minister after that. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  [Laughter] You were promoted very swiftly! Excellent. You’ve 
emphasised very much your awareness of the Commonwealth and your 
belief in the Commonwealth. Were you unusual in the Cabinet or in your 
party in this particular attachment to the value of the Commonwealth? 
Or was this a general sense within the party? Did you share this with 
your Prime Minister? 
 
MF:  I definitely shared it with the Prime Minister. I think other ministers tended to 
have a little bit less of an intensive relationship with the Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  In part because of their different portfolios? 
 
MF:  Yes, but then there are meetings of Commonwealth ministers on subjects like 
education, for example, and there would be regular meetings of 
Commonwealth Ministers of Education. So, some particular ministers would 
have a stronger relation with the Commonwealth than others. And I think it is 
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very much driven by how much the Commonwealth is engaging with countries 
on specific subjects. I would mention the Minister of Education, in particular, 
as another minister who was really conscious of being in the Commonwealth.   
 
  We are also quite conscious – as Malta – of something that has a bit fallen by 
the wayside but which remains very much in our collective psyche, I suppose, 
which is that we have the oldest university in the Commonwealth outside the 
UK. The University of Malta is the oldest university in the Commonwealth, 
outside the UK. It was founded in the 1500s and then raised in the 1600s to 
University status. I don’t think there are other 400 to 450 year old universities 
in the Commonwealth outside the UK. And, in any case, that may not be true, 
but that’s what our perception is of ourselves! [Laughter]  
 
SO:  A sense of being a centre of learning? 
 
MF:  Initially there was a sense that we could have developed as a Commonwealth 
university, as well. I think that is something which is on the increase now. 
There’s a lot of internationalisation of the university going on, and that could 
be another function of the Commonwealth: engaging with the Ministry of 
Education and with the Rector of the University, which is of course an 
autonomous institution. 
 
SO:  The Commonwealth of Learning was established at the Vancouver 
CHOGM in 1987. It seems to me that the whole university network of the 
Commonwealth of Learning operates in a slightly autonomous sphere – 
apart from the more traditional diplomacy and other soft power 
engagement of the Commonwealth. Would you concur with that?  
 
MF:  I don’t know enough about it to concur with that. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  Well, the very fact that you’re saying that suggests that it does seem to 
operate in a separate sphere. 
 
MF:  Yes, it operates, I think, in a different sphere from traditional diplomacy. It 
came very much to the forefront during my time serving as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs: it was there, but it didn’t really engage with us very much. I think we 
tried to engage with it when we were developing Commonwealth Connects as 
a repository of knowledge and expertise we were trying to share across the 
Commonwealth. 
  
  The original idea was that we should be sharing expertise and experience, 
and the idea was that those countries with the best expertise and experience 
in the Commonwealth should be exchanging that expertise and experience 
with those countries which needed it. So, it was a developmental approach, 
and the Commonwealth of Learning would have been part of that process in 
terms of ICT. We were limiting it to ICT, and therefore, for example, a country 
which would be the size of Malta, an island state – another island in the 
Commonwealth which had not the same level of development of ICT that 
Malta had – could benefit from Malta’s direct experience. That was the idea of 
Commonwealth Connects, initially. 
 
SO:  Please, if I could just ask you a little more about ICT? You emphasised 
this was very much a Maltese initiative, with Maltese diplomacy helping 
to drive this idea forward in conjunction with the Secretary General and 
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Secretariat in London? Or was this something of which Malta wanted to 
take ownership, and was providing particular expertise and also 
finance? 
 
MF:  No, Malta took a leadership [role] in this, with the setting of COMNET-IT. 
[COMNET-IT] was a foundation related to developing the knowledge and 
spreading the knowledge of ICT in the Commonwealth. Commonwealth 
Connects was not, initially, a Malta initiative. It was an initiative which had 
developed earlier, [and] I think it was through the Secretariat. Malta came in 
to give an added contribution, essentially through my chairmanship of that 
grouping which was called ‘ICT for Development’, and we changed that to 
Commonwealth Connects. There is a full report which was presented to the 
Kampala CHOGM which you might want to have a look at. There’s a full 
printed report and published report on ICT for Development, Commonwealth 
Connects, what we’ve done and what we intend to still do. It has some grand 
projects. One of them was called the ‘hole in the wall’. We were taking the 
experience of India of introducing computer terminals, computer screens and 
the use of internet in slum areas, and the idea was to transpose that 
experience into Africa and therefore take the Indian experience of taking ICT 
into disadvantaged communities and create ICT kiosks with four or five 
terminals. And, actually, the first one was launched in the Kampala CHOGM, 
in Kampala – I hope it’s still there. There is an ICT kiosk with five terminals in 
one of the poorest areas of Kampala, outside a school close to the town 
centre, for the use of all the community and also for the use of the schools – 
in other words, as part of the learning process of the schools themselves. In 
India, the experience of introducing them showed that, actually, there were 
other benefits resulting from it: that the young people had developed a set of 
rules to allow more people to make use of it, so you had a time limit on how 
long you could be there. It was a self-regulating type of system which 
developed slowly, and people were introducing themselves to the cyber 
world. 
 
  This is part of the [work] which Commonwealth Connects wants to do. 
Another project of Commonwealth Connects – which was then taken up by 
the Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation – was to map the 
areas of reach of internet connectivity in the whole of Commonwealth Africa, 
and therefore to identify those spots where there was still no connectivity 
where people were living, and, on that basis, to try develop a policy to fill in 
those spots and therefore have connectivity spread throughout the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  Michael, how much has this excellent developmental idea to stimulate 
ICT hotspots in deprived areas – which could then act as focal points 
for communities, for schools and also for entrepreneurial activity – then 
become eclipsed by the rollout of satellite phone coverage and the 
development of mobile phone software technology, which could then 
provide banking facilities and information? 
 
MF:  That was already there when we were doing this. It was very clear that mobile 
telephony – particularly in Africa – was going to be the technology that, in 
effect, increased connectivity exponentially in Africa. Still, however, we 
thought that the availability of a screen and of internet connectivity – not via 
the mobile phone – was still of use. So, it’s complementary to it. I don’t think it 
was eclipsed by it; I think it was very much complementary to it. 
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  One of the studies on connectivity also included the spread of mobile 
telephony, and – if I could put on my hat as a former Minister of 
Telecommunications – one of the biggest threats that you can have to 
development in telecommunications is if you give licences to operators to 
operate in the major urban areas, which is where they make their money, 
without imposing on them some level of universal service obligation. In other 
words, without imposing on them some roll-out obligation to those rural areas 
which are more sparsely populated, but which perhaps need the connectivity 
even more than the urban areas. So, the idea of taking a picture of the 
coverage available in Africa – particularly in Commonwealth Africa, which the 
CTO has been working on and I think is still working on – was intended to 
highlight those areas which were still without any level of coverage, even 
mobile telephony, because mobile and internet will go together now. And so, 
one of the grand projects of Commonwealth Connects was also to try and 
encourage this level of connectivity and to try and influence governments to 
push through this rollout. 
 
SO:  As you say, it’s to try to overcome the blockages or limitations of 
infrastructure, and that includes limited landline coverage. 
 
MF:  Absolutely. 
 
SO:  Mobile phone coverage is something on which African Commonwealth 
countries have made an exponential leap. 
 
MF:  I don’t know whether you’re aware that one of the biggest problems which 
fixed-line telephony had in Africa was that companies used to lay two copper 
lines: a real one, which would be at the bottom, and one which would be on 
top of it, which was there to be stolen. 
 
SO:  Absolutely. 
 
MF:  [Laughter] So, it was quite expensive, because you were laying two lines. 
Mobile telephony changed all that, because you could reach [new areas] 
without having to do that. Still, one of the biggest developments in East Africa 
in particular was the landing of marine cables in Kenya. And, of course, there 
had been other projects. One of the projects [involved] laying a marine fibre 
optic cable around the whole of Africa, and then have a sort of wheel and 
spokes approach. 
 
SO:  I’ve seen a map of this fibre optic cable route, with port points in East 
Africa, in South Africa and then there’s another point of entry up near 
the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
MF:  Yes. These are fairly recent developments. Telecommunications is the 
infrastructure of infrastructures. In a modern world, you are unable to develop 
your port facilities without telecommunications. You’re unable to develop your 
industrial facilities without telecommunications. Malta is a small island state, 
on the periphery of its major markets in Europe, [and] has learned that and 
luckily learned that in the 80s, which meant that we have taken a lot of 
investment. I can give you one recent example. A company that produces 
very specialised lenses for glasses in Malta purchased equipment – very 
sophisticated equipment – from Germany. All the servicing of that equipment 
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takes place remotely over the communication lines in Germany – so, from 
Germany to Malta. They had a fault in the machine. No technician would 
come, but they would fix it from Germany, and that means you’re no longer in 
the periphery. If you are somewhere lost in the middle of a very sparsely 
populated part of the country, if you have telecommunications you are no 
longer isolated, and that has a huge, huge impact on the economy.   
 
SO:  Michael, if I could take us from discussing the importance of the 
telecommunications sector and Maltese diplomacy toward your own 
personal experiences of the Commonwealth. You mentioned CMAG, the 
Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group. The critical issues that 
confronted you as Foreign Minister on this body were Fiji, Pakistan, 
Uganda, and Zimbabwe, which of course stepped outside the 
Commonwealth in 2003, at the Abuja meeting. 
 
MF:  There were some other countries that got on to the CMAG agenda. As you 
know, countries don’t like to be on the CMAG agenda, and that shows you the 
effectiveness of CMAG. Even if a country is not being formally engaged by 
CMAG, the moment it appears on the agenda it’s a sort of signalling for the 
country to take note. My experience of CMAG was a very positive one. I think 
it’s one of the most impressive institutions which exists in the Commonwealth. 
I think it is highly undervalued and it can be an example for other 
organisations. I have the impression that the African Union has something a 
little bit similar, but I don’t know how it’s working. CMAG, in my experience, 
was working extremely well. 
 
SO:  How did it work? Were there regular meetings? Or were they ad hoc and 
convened as the Secretary General or indeed the new members of 
CMAG felt appropriate? How was the agenda formulated? Did you have 
to be entirely responsive, or could you identify countries in which there 
were problems and bring them to the agenda? 
 
MF:  In terms of meeting, there was one fixed meeting which was the meeting on 
the margins of UN General Assembly. And there would be at least [one] other 
meeting during the year, but meetings would take place as needed. And, in 
fact, when there was the coup d’état in Fiji, we obviously needed to meet. I 
remember Don McKinnon had spoken to me; we agreed that there had to be 
a meeting and we should wait to give time for the Foreign Minister of Papua 
New Guinea who was from the region to get to the meeting. So, we did not 
really want to hold the meeting without having at least one member from that 
region present, because there is a little bit of this understanding in CMAG that 
if there’s a problem in a region, then the other members of the region will be 
given a little bit more weight in terms of the opinions which they express. So, 
the only concession we had for not holding a meeting immediately but holding 
it a few days later was to allow the Foreign Minister of Papua New Guinea to 
get to London. 
  
  Similarly with Pakistan, when we had been completely exasperated by the 
intransigence of President Musharraf and when we had seen that nothing 
could be done to save the situation – when Musharraf technically carried out 
a coup d’état against himself by suspending the Constitutional Court and 
suspending the Constitution… 
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SO:  And his declaration of the state of emergency, and sacking of their top 
judges… 
 
MF:  …everything outside the parameters of the constitution – then we called an 
immediate meeting there. So, meetings were held as needed, but I think on 
average twice a year. 
 
  The setting of the agenda was very much driven by the SG and the 
Secretariat. I have to say that – at least in my experience – because the 
resources of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malta are limited in terms of 
reach for all the Commonwealth states, it was not so easy for us to pinpoint 
any issues in countries, because we wouldn’t have any representation there. 
We could do that, I suppose, leaning on the knowledge which came to us 
through the EU, but in general terms, whenever there was an issue, the issue 
was raised by the Secretariat, so it was always on the agenda. 
 
SO:  Michael, did it involve you travelling to support the Secretary General’s 
‘good offices’ role? As Malta between 2005 and 2007 acted as Chair-in-
Office, you had a particular responsibility on CMAG? 
 
MF:  Well, we were also chairing CMAG between 2005 and 2007, so I did travel. I 
travelled to Pakistan and I travelled to Fiji at the request and by agreement of 
CMAG. So, as Chair of CMAG, part of the work of CMAG is complementary 
to what the SG does, but in full conjunction with the Secretariat: not in some 
sort of competitive role, and also with the support of the Secretariat. For 
example, when I went to Pakistan, a member of the Secretariat who was 
following the situation [also] came to Pakistan. She did not attend the meeting 
with Musharraf, but she came to give us support, and to give me support and 
information – to be there with the delegation. Similarly, when I went to Fiji… 
 
SO:  Please, if I could just ask you about the trip to Pakistan…? 
 
MF:  Yes. 
 
SO:  How did you approach this particular issue in terms of diplomacy, or the 
particular line of argument you used with General Musharraf? 
 
MF:  Well, the first important thing was getting the meeting with Musharraf. I did not 
request the meeting with Musharraf on his own. What we did – and this was 
very much in line in discussions with the Secretariat – was that I asked for a 
bilateral meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, so this was a 
bilateral Malta-Pakistan meeting. Then I asked that, after the meeting, I would 
be given a meeting with the President to discuss the Commonwealth [and] the 
CMAG issue. That’s exactly what happened. When we had the meeting with 
President Musharraf, there were only three people present: President 
Musharraf, myself and his Foreign Minister. There were no note takers. 
President Musharraf received me wearing his uniform, which I thought was a 
little bit rich, I suppose. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  Since that was the cause of the problem! [Laughter] 
 
MF:  And so I decided to pay him back for it, and I said, “Thank you very much, Mr 
President, for the meeting. As you know, the subject of the meeting is what 
you’re wearing,” to which, I have to say, he smiled. He was very charming 
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throughout the whole meeting. President Musharraf had made many 
promises to us at that stage, [saying] that he will take off his uniform, setting 
his own deadline. That deadline, I suspect, had not been reached yet but was 
about to be reached: it was close. So, in a way, I was there to reinforce that 
there was a date – which he had given us himself, by the way. The last 
deadline which CMAG set for Musharraf [was] to remove his uniform, 
therefore no longer remaining the Executive Chief, etc…. I mean, the uniform 
is a symbol. [The deadline] had been set by Musharraf himself. He said, “I will 
do it by…” So, that was taken over by CMAG and said, “Fine, as long as you 
do it by this time.” There was a general reluctance to destabilise or create 
anything which might destabilise Pakistan – understandably so, because 
Pakistan was and remains at the forefront of the fight against terrorism: 
against the Taliban and the issue of Afghanistan. There was a reluctance, I 
would say, among most members. 
   
SO:  I was going to say, given their role within the coalition in Afghanistan, 
there was the particular importance of Pakistan as a point of 
destabilisation for the Blair/Brown Government. 
 
MF:  And the UK and Canada were in CMAG at the time. They were members of 
CMAG. 
 
SO:  Were you also receiving any indications of serious concern from the 
Americans about the potential destabilisation of General Musharraf’s 
position? 
 
MF:  Not directly, no. Not directly. I would think they would have done that through 
the UK. [Laughter] But I never received anything directly from the Americans. 
What was interesting is that we did our very best, and we were playing 
around with the credibility of the Commonwealth to some extent because one 
of the underlying motives was that we did not want – and I discussed this 
many times with Don McKinnon, and it was his concern as well, I’m sure he 
can confirm that… 
 
SO:  He’s already alluded to this. 
 
MF:  …[we did not want] the Commonwealth seen as having been hard with the 
Africans and soft with the Asians. 
 
SO:  I asked him that exact question. 
 
MF:  There was a sensitivity, and my going to Pakistan was to do the bilateral 
meeting, which was needed, but much more of an excuse for us to actually do 
the Commonwealth part, [Laughter] and to do it softly, because in that way 
Pakistan would not feel that I went there as CMAG to tell the President to take 
off his uniform. But I went there on a bilateral mission, so it was soft 
diplomacy – softest of the soft – [Laughter] and then on the margins of my 
bilateral meeting, I had a meeting with him on the CMAG issue. That’s how 
we worked it out. 
 
SO:  ‘Constructive engagement’ [Laughter] is the phrase that the Americans 
used with a similar approach towards Southern Africa. 
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MF:  We left it [at] that. He was committed to removing his uniform by the deadline, 
if I remember correctly, and that was that. 
 
SO:  Did you meet with other elements in Pakistan? 
 
MF:  I met the Prime Minster, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the President. But 
I engaged with the President directly on this issue, not with the others. What 
happened then was that Musharraf lost it, to some extent, and as you’ve just 
mentioned, he got a state of emergency, he suspended the constitution – just 
about everything. We called an urgent meeting of CMAG. There was still a 
reluctance…I could still feel a reluctance from the UK and from Canada to 
suspend Pakistan at this stage. We had a five to six hour meeting trying to 
achieve… Pakistan was being strongly defended by Sri Lanka, and, to some 
extent, also by Malaysia, but not so strongly. It was more Sri Lanka that was 
making the case for Pakistan. 
 
SO:  Why, because of regional solidarity? 
 
MF:  I think so. And they’d reached out to the Sri Lankans to try to help them with 
the confrontation. Mark Malloch Brown was representing the UK [at the 
meeting]; it might be interesting to ask for his views that. The consensus we 
managed to achieve – and I had to negotiate very hard and long hours for 
that – was that we would suspend Pakistan if Pakistan did not do one, two, 
three [things] by the time we met again in Kampala, which was, I think, a 
month away – a month or two away. So, if you are to understand how that 
worked out, you have to see two declarations of CMAG: the one in London 
and the one in Kampala. When we met in Kampala… 
 
SO:  The CHOGM convened on 23rd November, 2007.  
 
MF:  Yes. When we met in Kampala, I used a tactic because I felt that now we 
really had the credibility of the Commonwealth at stake. It was my firm belief 
that we had to suspend Pakistan or CMAG would become a charade, and the 
Commonwealth would lose a lot of credibility. It was also the strong feeling of 
Don McKinnon. So, what I did was, I knew there was one paragraph on 
suspension. I got a discussion on all the other paragraphs except that 
paragraph. We discussed them for a very long time, and Sri Lanka was 
making amendments to every one of them and we went through all of them. 
And then there was one section – one other paragraph, which was not the 
paragraph of suspension – which stated that although there has been 
progress, the conditions laid down in our London declaration had substantially 
not been met by Pakistan. There was a huge discussion on that, lasting many 
hours, and finally Sri Lanka wanted to put a positive angle [on it] – which was 
again admitting that there was progress – and then accepting that the 
progress was not enough, and that this substantially did not meet with the 
requirements of London. I got a consensus on that section. I then came to my 
final paragraph of suspension, and Mark Malloch Brown said, “Well, Mr 
Chairman, now we need to find consensus on this paragraph on suspension.” 
I said, “Excuse me, Mark, but actually it’s the other way around. I will only 
accept not suspending Pakistan if there is a consensus not to suspend. I don’t 
need a consensus to suspend, because if you look at the London declaration 
we said we would suspend if Pakistan do not meet our conditions. We now 
have agreed that the conditions have not been met – there’s consensus 
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around the table – and so I will only accept the situation of no suspension if 
we now have a full consensus not to suspend.”   
 
SO:  Adept diplomacy! And argued like a lawyer. 
 
MF:  I was absolutely on the right side. We had the press conference at two o’clock 
in the morning, and all the ministers were there – including the minister from 
Sri Lanka – saying that this is the decision that’s been taken. I think we 
defended the credibility of the Commonwealth by doing that. There was a 
hullabaloo the next day. The Prime Minister of Sri Lanka was livid with his 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. I was taken to task by, of all people, the President 
of Ghana when I was reporting as Chairman of CMAG to the heads as to why 
on earth we took upon ourselves the decision to suspend.  
 
SO:  When it should have been the heads that made the decision? 
 
MF:  He said, “You should have recommended it to us, and then we should have 
made the decision because we are here.” [But] it had been very clearly 
established for a very long time that that decision would be taken by CMAG. 
And, in fact, Don McKinnon had told me, “I am completely sure that the heads 
will be very happy to have that decision taken by CMAG, because then they 
can say it’s not theirs.” But that was not the case. I was taken to task by the 
President of Ghana, who might have had another reason to do that. 
 
SO:  I was going to say. There would be an agenda there. 
 
MF:  So, in any case, we did the right thing, I think, for the Commonwealth. I have 
to say, after the meeting of London, the decision to suspend Pakistan if they 
don’t meet our requirements was item one on Al-Jazeera, item one on BBC 
News and BBC World, and item one on CNN. I was actually interviewed live 
on all those news bulletins in London, which shows that although the 
Commonwealth is a soft power, if it uses the soft power in the right way it can 
also influence international opinion. I think we underplay this very often. My 
experience of CMAG was exactly the opposite: that it does have a lot of 
influence on international affairs if it wants to. 
 
SO:  If I could go back to Fiji. You have indicated that Fiji was very much part 
of your concerns between 2005 and 2006. 
 
MF:  That was easy. Fiji was easy. 
 
SO:  In what way? 
 
MF:  Fiji was a coup d’état. So, what do you in a coup d’état? [Laughter] 
 
SO:  As you say, CMAG’s remit had emerged from the Millbrook Declaration 
of 1995 to deal with military overthrows. 
 
MF:  Fiji was outright. Fiji had to be suspended. The issue was how we were going 
to do it, and how we were going to coordinate, and that was a very valid point 
raised by Don McKinnon. I think the Commonwealth did a great job there of 
coordinating the Commonwealth’s actions with that of the Pacific Islands 
Forum, with that of the UN, and with that of the EU. So, there was a 
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coordination of our work with those three institutions to try and be as effective 
as possible.  
 
SO:  Was that you as Chair of CMAG doing this coordinating?   
 
MF:  No, that was the Secretariat, but CMAG was obviously also conscious of that. 
I went [and] I asked to speak to Commodore Bainimarama and he accepted. 
He received me. He was critical of CMAG – they were making his life more 
difficult, and making it more difficult for him – rather than understanding that 
he needs to go back to democracy. Again, I suppose he paid lip service to the 
fact that he was going to adopt a new constitution and that this was a 
transitory position. When we were there, we also met with members from the 
opposition groupings. It was a bit of a hopeless task, actually, with him. It was 
a bit of a hopeless task. In that meeting, he was very courteous, but he was 
not really willing to engage on anything in particular.  
   
  So, he courteously saw me, but I don’t think we had much effect on him. 
[Laughter] And, in fact, as you can see, Fiji’s lost to some extent. We were 
looking, at the time, at whether we could also engage with the ‘Elders’ in Fiji, 
who had some sort of influence, but we did not – at least I did not go with 
CMAG. As far as I’m aware – I don’t follow the Fiji situation very much – we’re 
still in the same boat, no? 
 
SO:  They are due to hold elections this year, by September 2014, under a 
new constitution. 
 
  On the question of Uganda, obviously there was growing domestic 
opposition to President Museveni’s rule and yet Kampala was the 
designated next venue for the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting. Did that complicate your particular role on CMAG? I know that 
there were issues concerning President Museveni’s resistance to the 
reintroduction of plural politics; there were questions of Human Rights 
violations, etc. Was that ever officially a concern of yours? 
 
MF:  Yes. Uganda was on the agenda. I’m not sure whether that was formally on 
the agenda or not. There was the issue of the re-election. There was an issue 
of whether presidential terms there should be two times or three times, which 
needed a change in the constitution. There were issues about the stifling of 
the opposition, and I think we had got to the point where the good offices of 
the SG were being used there. 
 
  We didn’t really have much of an argument about extending the two terms to 
more than two terms, quite frankly. It was at the same time when France 
changed its constitution to allow the president to run for more than two terms. 
So, legally it was a very difficult issue to raise, but I know that Don McKinnon 
was very much engaged on the issues of Human Rights and Civil Society. 
 
SO:  So, as Chair of CMAG you were not acting in tandem to the SG’s good 
offices to try and alleviate the situation? 
 
MF:  No, I was not really engaged as Chair. It had not reached that stage. The only 
two countries that were really engaged in the CMAG were Fiji and Pakistan, 
and the most difficult one was Pakistan. 
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SO:   Could I ask you, please, about your candidacy for the SG position? 
 
MF:  Yes, of course. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  When did you first actively consider putting your name forward? 
 
MF:  I have to say that it fitted in with what I wanted to do at that stage in my life, 
which is [that] I wanted to dedicate a portion of my life to development work, 
and I thought the Commonwealth was a huge opportunity for development. I 
also could see that, with the Malaysian candidacy, we could take on the fight. 
I spoke to friends of mine in the Indian Cabinet to check whether India would 
have a candidate. Particularly, I spoke to Kamal Nath, who then spoke to 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who came back with the answer that they 
will not have a candidate. [Laughter] I spoke with my Prime Minister who said, 
“We’ll support you if you go for this.” Cyprus was very enthusiastically 
supporting. We decided to put [forward] the candidature. As things then 
turned out, through the influence of Sonia Gandhi, India did have a candidate, 
but by the time that came through I had already started my campaign. I had 
already made a commitment with my own electorate in Malta, and I basically 
decided that the only honourable death was death in battle. We were getting 
very positive responses from the Caribbean, which actually retained a certain 
solidity of front in terms of my candidature, even up to the voting, as far as I 
know – excluding Trinidad, which had an Indian presence, and Guyana, 
which had an Indian presence. So, we could not get a full… 
 
SO:  Now, is that the factor of the ‘wider Indian world’ within the 
Commonwealth? 
 
MF:  Yes, of course. So, we could not get a full endorsement by CARICOM, but 
excluding those two, I think we had the support of the island states. I was 
putting my candidature to them as a candidature of the island states within 
the Commonwealth. Obviously, I was going to do that. We immediately had 
signs from Britain that they were not really supportive of our candidature, 
particularly when the Indian candidature then came on board. The Canadians 
were a bit non-committal. But we were also putting across the argument that 
having an SG from a country that is also a member of the EU would be 
tremendously beneficial for the Commonwealth, particularly as we are also 
putting the case that I was the only politician throwing my hat in the ring and 
that therefore we needed a politician to give political direction and vision to 
the Commonwealth. That was, to my mind, directly opposite of what the 
British were looking for. 
 
  Asia was a bit difficult to consider. I lobbied the Pacific, but in the Pacific, of 
course, you also have an Indian presence. We lobbied the Pacific states: 
some were more receptive than others. Samoa was more receptive than 
others; Tonga was not receptive at all. In fact, they actually told me they could 
not hold the bilateral meeting which was near the time there was the Pacific 
Islands Forum there. So, I visited as a tourist, but eventually I got admitted to 
the Pacific Islands Forum through our own contacts. The head of the 
household of the King, actually, was a graduate of the University of Malta, 
[Laughter] so we had other ways of getting there! [Laughter] It was a big fight, 
we gave a big fight. I got a lot of support from the Foreign Minister of South 
Africa… 
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SO:  Did you? That’s interesting. 
 
MF:  …who is now the President of the Commission of the African Union. 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. She, I think, had got Mbeki to support me, and 
with Mbeki came the SADC. So, the fight, really, was to try and get African 
support. Who gets African support in the end was going to win.  
 
  I had support from Tanzania, or at least sympathy from Tanzania, because 
the Foreign Minister was on CMAG and could see how we were operating 
CMAG. I think the fairness issue was also an issue for them. In the end, 
however, Mbeki changed his vote. After the Queen’s Dinner, which was the 
day before the vote, Mbeki looked up our Prime Minister and told him he was 
going to support Malta, support my candidature. I am informed that there was 
a meeting after that dinner between Manmohan Singh and Mbeki – very late 
at night [or in the] early hours of the morning – and that actually resulted in 
Mbeki changing his vote, and, with Mbeki, SADC.   
 
  What was interesting was that, after we lost, an official from the British 
delegation – unfortunately, I don’t know him and I don’t know his name – 
came to my group as we were sitting down outside and said, “I know it’s the 
wrong time, but I just had to tell you that we did not expect you to give us 
such a good fight.” [Laughter] 
 
  I then went back to Malta. This was November 2007 [and] we had elections in 
March 2008. To a large extent, my decision to run for SG in the 
Commonwealth cost me my seat, because then people thought, “Why should 
we vote for this guy if this guy wants to go somewhere else?” There wasn’t 
enough time between November and March… 
 
SO:  To ramp up your political campaign at home, no.  
 
MF:  So, I actually lost my seat in 2008. I regained it a bit later through a bi-
election, but there you are. I learned a lot in the process, and I think we 
exponentially increased Malta’s exposure in the Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  Undoubtedly so. 
 
MF:  And there you are; that’s how it works. 
 
SO:  Politics is a brutal business. 
 
MF:  [Laughter] It’s part of the game. But I tried. We were trying to ambush – to get 
a surprise result – and we were very, very close to that. We were very close 
to that, because the Indians were in a panic on the last day. They were really 
in a panic. And I was interviewed by David Frost – now, I don’t know why he 
interviewed me, but he interviewed me – on Frost Over the World. You can 
find it on YouTube. His last question to me was, “I understand that you might 
be the next SG of the Commonwealth. From my soundings, I understand that 
you are likely to be – that you might be.” And my answer to that was, “That 
depends to whom you have been speaking.” So, maybe he got that fear as 
well. I wouldn’t like to think it was an attempt to get me out of the reception 
which was going on at the time! [Laughter] 
 
SO:  Oh, no. I don’t take conspiracy theories quite that far! 
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MF:  [Laughter] I wouldn’t take conspiracy theories that far. I think it was a genuine 
thing. It just happened a bit at the wrong time for me, because there was…I 
went back to the reception after that, but… 
 
  There was a feeling…The expression is, I suppose, being a bit of a ‘surprise 
result’. That’s what we were trying to achieve: getting in under the radar. 
 
SO:  It would have been a coup by small islands states. Not a coup d’état, 
obviously! But a political coup. 
 
MF:  It would have been a political coup by the small islands states, but people are 
influenced by other prospects. 
 
SO:  When you mentioned that meeting between Manmohan Singh and 
Mbeki, I was thinking immediately about whether there were other fora 
influencing their decisions – such as IBSA Dialogue Forum, possibly, or 
South Africa trying to become a BRIC, or whether it was just the 
bilateral relationship… 
 
MF:  South Africa is a BRIC. And South Africa has a huge Indian population, and 
South Africa was facing an election. 
 
SO:  Cynics, I am afraid, describe it as a ‘little s’ in BRICs! 
 
MF:  It’s an S in the BRICS. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  It is an ‘s’, BRICs, but that is a little ‘s'! 
 
MF:  But it has also an Indian population, since the time of Mahatma Gandhi, and it 
was facing an election. So, these are things which can happen. You know, I 
had the Foreign Minister of Australia telling me in Tonga [that], “There is no 
doubt in our mind that you are the candidate that we should support, but 
we’re supporting India.” [Laughter] 
 
SO:  That’s precious little consolation. [Laughter] Absolutely no consolation 
at all! But, Michael, thank you very much indeed for giving that 
important personal view of what was a critical election, with the benefit 
of hindsight. 
 
  Please, can I just ask you a concluding question about the Queen and 
her contribution? What are your particular observations on the role of 
the Headship, the personality of HM the Queen, and what do you feel 
this says about the Commonwealth going forward? 
 
MF:  The Queen is a professional. She’s not just a monarch, she’s a professional. I 
have seen her operate in a group where she works the crowd like any 
seasoned politician. She carries a lot of charm and prestige. I will repeat what 
I said at the meeting in Cambridge, that I cannot understand why the 
presence of the Queen as the head of the Commonwealth can, in any way, 
influence the position or status of the SG. I don’t think any SG is cowed by the 
fact that there’s a Queen as head of the Commonwealth. The issue is 
whether heads want to retain the British monarch as the head of the 
Commonwealth. 
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  In a way, it’s whether they want to keep this tradition. I mean, the 
Commonwealth really has developed out of the former colonies of the British 
Empire, so why should this be something that’s going to be hidden in some 
way? Okay, I believe it should be developing further as a development 
organisation – it should go beyond that – but I think it has gone beyond that. I 
don’t think it’s a major issue, and I don’t think it should be made into a major 
issue. There have been discussions on whether the head of the 
Commonwealth should be elected from among the leaders of the 
Commonwealth. Many people mentioned the example of Mandela as possibly 
having been a great head of the Commonwealth, but when you read the 
literature, the comment is that if people mention Mandela then they cannot 
mention anyone else! [Laughter] I think that’s quite right, actually. 
 
  So, I think if there’s going to be a headship, I see no particular reason why 
that should change. I think there’s consensus on the Queen. Whether they’ll 
be consensus on Prince Charles, I think, depends on how he tackles the 
issue. I see no reason why not. 
 
SO:  How did you observe the role of royal hospitality at the Valletta CHOGM 
in 2005? Did it help to ease any particular tensions? Did it provide an 
additional reinforcement to the importance of Valletta being the chosen 
venue? 
 
MF:  I’m not sure whether this is something which is crucial to the Commonwealth, 
but whenever there is an aspect of royal hospitality, it’s normally a unifying 
moment around the person of the Queen – who, in any case, is a non-
executive head of state. So, it’s a titular head of state and she’s a titular head 
of the Commonwealth: she has really no decision-making in the 
Commonwealth or in the processes of the Commonwealth. Many of the 
Commonwealth states are republics. The only other alternative might be just 
to remove the title of head of Commonwealth altogether, but why should we 
give up a bit of tradition? I think it’s a bit of tradition. It requires a head of the 
Commonwealth. It requires an SG of the Commonwealth to be a forceful 
character with the international press, because one thing the headship of the 
Queen does with the international press is that they concentrate on it as if the 
Commonwealth consists of the headship of the Queen and the rest of it. But, 
to give one example of somebody who is not in office, I don’t think that Sonny 
Ramphal was in any way overshadowed… 
 
SO:  No. [Laughter] 
 
MF:  …by the fact that the Queen was head of the Commonwealth. So, it depends 
on how an SG of the Commonwealth handles the international press. I think 
the international press also needs to be educated on what the 
Commonwealth does, and that means that it needs to be taken head on, 
which is not an easy task, but it’s a task which requires some political skill. 
And so, again, I don’t see any reason for change. I think there’s a lot that can 
be said for continuity.  
 
  What I do think is important is that this matter is put behind us as early as 
possible. We don’t want this issue to come up when, God forbid [Laughter], 
The Queen passes away, which is humanly inevitable. And so, I think it is 
better that planning takes place in a calm way and in a decisive way, and an 
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opening of this discussion could take place at the next CHOGM in Malta, 
actually. An opening of discussion: not necessarily a closure of the 
discussion, but maybe the point should be mooted. “What do we think about 
the Head of the Commonwealth? Let’s have an exchange, a frank exchange 
of views, to see what the feeling is.” I think it might be useful. 
 
SO:  I have to say, there’s quite a bit riding on that next Commonwealth 
Heads of Government Meeting in your country. [Laughter] 
 
MF:  Looks like it! [Laughter]  
 
SO:  Michael, thank you very much. 
 
MF:  There is one more thing I would like to add. The Commonwealth must leave 
space for informality among the heads of Government. 
 
SO:  The question of the Retreat. 
 
MF:  The general feeling of why CHOGM takes place, the Retreat is part of it, but 
particularly, the Retreat… The more we formalise the Retreat, the more we 
may lose the value of the Retreat. 
 
SO:  In 2005, it was also a conscious decision by Malta to have a longer 
Retreat. 
 
MF:  Yes, and I think [heads] should be together, and it should give space to prime 
ministers from smaller states who would not have the opportunity to engage 
with a major G8 leader, [or] a prime minister from a BRIC or BRICS, a country 
of BRICS, to engage and to even strike a personal relationship and a 
friendship. Because that is the huge value which smaller states gain from the 
Commonwealth. The moment you formalise this, it becomes like the UN. 
 
SO:  I was going to say, like another international organisation.  
 
MF:  It’s what you don’t want. It has to be the family of nations; it has to be the 
family of the Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  Yes. 
 
MF:  The concept of family is quite important. In a certain way, the Queen, being a 
mother, is a little bit of a mother [Laughter] of the Commonwealth. Well, it has 
a little bit of that touch, but that’s not the reason why it’s the family of the 
Commonwealth. It has to be a family of the Commonwealth – the sense of 
family among the heads of government. 
 
SO:  Did you got into the Retreat? Did you attend the Retreat in Valetta? 
 
MF:  No. I think that’s right, though. I feel the Retreat should be for heads only; 
that’s why it’s a Retreat. But it should be more informal, and they should have 
more time together. They should have more time to interact: to chat, to meet 
each other, to even raise bilateral issues with each other, if they need to. That 
is the concept of putting them altogether, and that is what adds value to that. 
If it becomes a meeting with very formal agendas, the very formal approach, I 
think you kill the whole spirit of it. 
22 
 
 
SO:  Yes, okay. Thank you very much.  
 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
 
 
 
 
